Friday, 2 October 2026
Community desk · cautionary view

Mubende and Kassanda: an eviction, a decade on

Clearing a site is fast. Rebuilding the consent that clearing destroyed takes a decade, and sometimes it does not happen at all.

Filed by
Grace NabwireEast Africa
Published
Reading
8 min

Executive summary

Clearing a site is fast. Rebuilding the consent that clearing destroyed takes a decade, and sometimes it does not happen at all.

Desk
Community
Stance
Cautionary
Sources
2 cited
Reading
8 min
Section 01

The episode

The removal of artisanal miners from goldfields in Mubende and Kassanda districts displaced a very large informal workforce and remains one of the most contested events in Uganda's recent mining history. Compensation and resettlement questions have persisted for years.

What made the episode unusual, relative to smaller localised evictions elsewhere in the country, was its scale and its documentation. Human rights organisations, domestic media and international observers all tracked the aftermath closely, which means the case has entered the reference set that communities, investors and civil society groups now cite whenever a new licence is proposed anywhere in the country.

Section 02

The lasting effect on licensing

Communities elsewhere in the country now read the arrival of a licence-holder through that precedent. Operators inherit a trust deficit they did not create, and the cost of overcoming it is a real line in a development budget.

That inherited distrust is asymmetric in an important way: a single high-profile failure of this kind casts a longer shadow than several well-handled resettlements, because it confirms the worst-case scenario communities already fear rather than the median outcome. Operators who behave well are, in effect, competing against a reputational baseline set by the worst precedent rather than an average one.

What made the episode unusual, relative to smaller localised evictions elsewhere in the country, was its scale and its documentation.
Analyst note · Community desk
Data visualiser

Jurisdiction friction score, selected gold regimes

  • Canada18
  • Ghana34
  • Tanzania47
  • Uganda52
  • DRC78
Jurisdiction friction score, selected gold regimes
StageValue (index)
Canada18
Ghana34
Tanzania47
Uganda52
DRC78

Composite of licence-transfer time, royalty stability and export-permit reliability. Lower is smoother.

Section 03

What reduces the risk

Early engagement with existing workings, negotiated coexistence or absorption of artisanal labour into the formal workforce, and documented compensation. These are cheaper than the alternative in every case where the alternative has been tested.

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Section 04

The counter-argument

A licence-holder or government official could reasonably argue that some evictions are unavoidable where informal working genuinely conflicts with a legally granted mineral right, and that indefinitely delaying enforcement to negotiate with every informal occupant would make formal investment in central Uganda's goldfields effectively impossible, penalising the licensed operator for the state's own historic failure to police encroachment earlier.

There is real substance to that position: not every artisanal presence on licensed ground represents a legitimate, negotiable claim, and operators cannot be expected to fund an indefinite coexistence with occupants who have no tenure basis at all. Our point is not that eviction is never justified, it is that the manner and sequencing of the Mubende and Kassanda episode, and the absence of a resolved compensation process years later, is what generated the durable reputational cost, not the underlying legal right to enforce a licence.

Quick answers
Why does the Mubende and Kassanda eviction still shape Ugandan mining licensing today?
The removal of artisanal miners from those goldfields displaced a very large informal workforce and was closely tracked by human rights organisations, domestic media and international observers, making it a reference point communities now cite whenever a new licence is proposed elsewhere in the country.
Do operators today inherit the reputational cost of that episode even if they were not involved?
Yes. A single high-profile failure casts a longer shadow than several well-handled resettlements, because it confirms the worst-case scenario communities already fear. Operators effectively compete against that reputational baseline rather than an average one.
What reduces the risk of a repeat of the Mubende and Kassanda outcome?
Early engagement with existing artisanal workings, negotiated coexistence or absorption of artisanal labour into the formal workforce, and documented compensation. These have consistently proved cheaper than the alternative where tested.
Sources and further reading
Access private briefings

Desk alerts for the precious metals sector

Reserve evaluations, licensing changes and market notes, sent when the file moves. No promotional mail.

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